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Abstract 
After more than sixty years, Shannon's research continues to raise fundamental 
questions, such as the one formulated by R. Luce, which is still unanswered: “Why is 
information theory not very applicable to psychological problems, despite apparent 
similarities of concepts?” On this topic, S. Pinker, one of the foremost defenders of the 
widespread computational theory of mind, has argued that thought is simply a type of 
computation, and that the gap between human cognition and computational models may 
be illusory. In this context, in his latest book, titled Thinking Fast and Slow, D. 
Kahneman provides further theoretical interpretation by differentiating the two assumed 
systems of the cognitive functioning of the human mind. He calls them intuition (system 
1) determined to be an associative (automatic, fast and perceptual) machine, and 
reasoning (system 2) required to be voluntary and to operate logical-deductively. In this 
paper, we propose a mathematical approach inspired by Ausubel’s meaningful learning 
theory for investigating, from the constructivist perspective, information processing in 
the working memory of cognizers. Specifically, a thought experiment is performed 
utilizing the mind of a dual-natured creature known as Maxwell’s demon: a tiny “man-
machine” solely equipped with the characteristics of system 1, which prevents it from 
reasoning. The calculation presented here shows that the Ausubelian learning schema, 
when inserted into the creature’s memory, leads to a Shannon-Hartley-like model that, 
in turn, converges exactly to the fundamental thermodynamic principle of computation, 
known as the Landauer limit. This result indicates that when the system 2 is shut down, 
both an intelligent being, as well as a binary machine, incur the same minimum energy 
cost per unit of information (knowledge) processed (acquired), which mathematically 
shows the computational attribute of the system 1, as Kahneman theorized. This finding 
links information theory to human psychological features and opens the possibility to 
experimentally test the computational theory of mind by means of Landauer’s energy 
cost, which can pave a way toward the conception of a multi-bit reasoning machine. 
Keywords:  Computationalism; Ausubel’s learning theory; Cognitive structure; 
Landauer limit; Maxwell’s demon; Shannon-Hartley model. 
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Introduction 
 
Pinker (2005)'s evolutionary arguments have 
suggested that thought can be understood as a 
form of computation. This philosophical 
perspective is known as the computational theory 
of mind and claims that an intelligent being works 
exactly as a computer works when it interprets an 
outside stimulus. However, such authors as Luce 
(2003) have asserted that the gap between 
psychology and information theory remains open, 
particularly when applying the concept of channel 
capacity to the context of the brain. From a 
viewpoint aligned with the notion of information 
in statistical theory (Laming, 2010) has presented 
the hypothesis that the human mind is a purely 
physical communication system. For Laming, the 
efficiency of brain performance directly depends 
on the connection between stimuli and channel 
characteristics.  
 
From this same physicalist idea, Ladyman (2009) 
made a challenging statement asserting that if the 
brain implements computations as the 
computational theory of mind holds, the human 
mind necessarily must obey computational 
principles, such as the Landauer limit, that is a 
minimum cost energy per unit of information 
erased (processed) in a memory device (Landauer, 
1961; Bennett, 1982; Bennett, 1987; Bennett, 
2003; Maroney, 2009; Lambson et al. 2011). 
 
In this context, several studies have (to date) 
reported an inability to find the “missing link” 
between psychology and information theory 
(Luce, 2003; Lenski, 2010). These studies have 
addressed the relationship between the 
presuppositions of intelligence and computation 
from a thermodynamic perspective only, but here 
we present an alternative path that starts from a 
psychological perspective and arrives at 
Landauer's thermodynamic limit, showing that 
this computational principle is the common 
frontier to both the cognitive and the machine 
worlds. 
Theoretical background 
We have interpreted Ausubel's meaningful 
learning theory (Ausubel, 1963; Novak, 2002; 
Novak and Gowin, 2002; Seel, 2003; Smith, 2006; 
Ausubel, 2010; Moon et al.2011) as supporting a 
thought experiment (Buzzoni, 2008) regarding 
changes in mental state when information is 
meaningly assimilated by a cognitive system. 
Recent brain studies also lend support to the 
fundamental idea in Ausubel’s constructivist 
theory that knowledge stored during meaningful 
learning is fundamentally organized differently 
than knowledge learned by memorizing process 
using routine or repetition (Novak, 2011). 
 
According to the Ausubelian view, information 
becomes meaningful to an individual when it is 
“anchored” to relevant aspects (ideas or concepts) 
of the pre-existing cognitive structure, which are 
known as the subsumers.  
 
Therese subsumers are constructs that can be 
thought of as idiosyncratic receptors that are 
equivalent to binding sites responsible for the 
specific recognition of new information. In 
addition to specific recognition, lock-key 
interactions between units of information and 
other less-related subsumers can also occur 
simultaneously, leading to mismatching. However, 
in accordance with Novak (2010), learning is 
more efficient when the initial external input is 
matched to the specific shape of the learner's 
framework. Therefore, an effective subsumption 
(assimilation) process occurs when units of 
information are associated in a complementary 
way to subsumers of the pre-existing structure, at 
which point the new information is internalized in 
the individual’s framework. Both the information 
and subsumers are modified in an adaptive 
process, and the result of this subsumption is the 
learning of new concepts. The quantitative feature 
this learning is a new framework consisting of 
subsumers that are more differentiated with 
increased affinity to external stimuli. Ausubel 
describes this entire adaptive process as 
“progressive differentiation”. 
 
Based on the Ausubelian learning, the cognitive 
structure can be treated as a N-subsumers 
function, . Changes to this 
structure occur through an “interactional 
products” (Ausubel,1963; Seel, 2003; Ausubel, 
2010) between external inputs ( )1 2, ,..., NI I I and 
the subsumers . Consequently, the 
number of units of information learned in a 
determined time interval is proportional to the 
sum of all the contributions of the matchings, 
i js I , as well as the mismatchings. Thus, the units 
of information I and the binding sites of cognitive 
structure  should be 
complementary to some degree. In this work, this 
associative condition is represented by a similarity 
metric, 
i js I
D .  
 
In addition to the restructuring caused by external 
stimuli, the individual’s framework undergoes 
continuous self-restructuring. This process is 
dynamic, and complementary relationships 
between multiple concepts (subsumers) already 
established in the individual’s framework can also 
occur (Smith, 2006; Moon et al.2011). Certain 
elements in the framework can be perceived to be 
related to themselves. As a result, such 
relationships can also lead to structural self-
reorganization. Ausubel describes this 
combination of previously existing elements in the 
cognitive structure, or self-reorganization 
provoked by self-interaction between subsumers, 
as an “integrative reconciliation” process. This 
process can be represented by a complementary 
function, , in which the subsumers of the  
set have shapes that are complementary to those of 
the subsumers of the  set. The meaningful 
learning is complete when integrative 
reconciliation occurs, i.e., when general concepts 
and their respective subsumers are differentiated 
and integrated wich each other. (Novak, 1977). 
 
A model for meaningful learning 
 
Ausubel (2010) wrote that the most natural way to 
acquire knowledge is through progressive 
differentiation; however, lateral connections 
between concepts can exist without the need for a 
hierarchy, thereby suggesting an integrative 
reconciliation of ideas. Novak and Gowin (2002) 
have asserted that this kind of integrative 
connectivity is associated with original and 
creative cognitive constructions in human beings.  
 
Progressive differentiation and integrative 
reconciliation are clearly governed by two types 
of human cognitive processes (Kahneman, 2002; 
Kahneman, 2011) labeled system 1 and system 2, 
respectively. This mental behavior is a so-called 
dual-process1 (Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, 
2011) which distinguishes system 1 (which creates 
an automatic activation based on such properties 
as similarity, pattern recognition and perception 
from external stimuli) from system 2 (which 
creates a conscious activation making use of 
logical principles). Based on this dual functioning 
of the mind, a human’s meaningful learning can 
be mathematically modeled using the law of mass 
action (Jones et al. 2010), which is widely known 
and is used to describe relationships between 
biological entities. The implementation of this law 
is founded on the assumption that biological 
                                                          
1
 Pozo (2008), quoting Ausubel's theory, among others, also 
identifies two processes of learning: an automatic (effortless), and a 
controlled (effortful) that occurs voluntarily. These two ways to 
acquire knowledge are intrinsically (and clearly) attached to dual 
process theory of mind. 
 
agents interact mathematically with susceptible 
populations through a multiplication operation, 
similar to the “interactional product” concept 
proposed by Ausubel for the subsumption process 
(Moreira, 1993; Moreira, 2011; Konrad, 2007; 
Seel, 2003).  
 
Thus, in the approach presented in this report, 
units of information and subsumers are treated in a 
manner analogous to the treatment of biological 
agents and susceptible populations, respectively. 
Consequently, the temporal behavior of an 
individual’s mental structure can be defined by a 
dynamical approach, as follows:   
                                                
( )1 2
, 1
, ,..., ( , ),
i j
N
N s I i j
i j
d S s s s D s I f s s
dt
=
= +∑              (1)                    
where the  terms are external inputs per unit 
time, and  are subsumers belonging to 
the pre-existing framework.  The 
, 1
i j
N
s I i j
i j
D s I
=
∑ term 
represents the process of progressive 
differentiation governed by system 1; 
i js I
D  is a 
normalized matching metric (
,
0 1
i js I
D≤ ≤ ) that 
measures the affinity between  and . 
The additive quantity is an exchange term 
that represents the sum of the contributions of the 
self-interactions between subsumers, representing 
the process of integrative reconciliation governed 
by system 2, and  is the modification rate of the 
cognitive structure per unit time as a result of the 
subsumption (assimilation) process. According to 
our approach of the law of mass action, this 
modification rate2 replaces the Ausubelian 
interactional product3, , in the final stage of the 
subsumption process. 
 
Here, we consider that the binding sites of 
cognitive structure (subsumers) can be modeled 
by binary strings of length ℓ (Burgin,2010; 
Seising, 2010; Hosoya et al. 2011). So, a 
                                                          
2
 It is important to highlight that our contextual motivation for 
using a rate of modification of the cognitive structure (a metric 
over time that is directly proportional to the product of the 
information and the subsumers) was essentially inspired by Piaget 
(2001), because, according to Wadsworth (2003), the Piagetian 
assimilation process accounts for the growth of the intellectual 
structure that is provoked by, in his words, “a quantitative change”. 
For his part, Novak (2010) claims that Piaget's assimilation process 
and Ausubel's subsumption process are elementally similar. In 
passing, Ausubel himself recognized a general similarity between 
Piaget's formulation of the assimilation process and his own 
assimilation theory (Ausubel et al., 1978; Nielson, 1980), which 
led us to infer that the Ausubelian subsumption can be 
quantitatively treated. 
3
 Note that the Ausubelian interactional product, sI , which 
features the core of the learning schema by assimilation, is an 
associative (adaptive) representational procedure. Goldammer and 
R. Kaehr (1989) argued that adaptive learning can be represented 
by a Hebbian algorithm that simulates the linkage between the 
domain and the internal structure. On the other hand, Gerstner and 
Kistler (2002) claimed that Hebbian learning is a bilinear-type 
operation that represents a mathematical abstraction of coincidence 
detection mechanisms. So, taking into account that the internal 
structure is represented in our thought experiment by a space of 
subsumers, and that a domain space is just the boundary condition 
of this structure (i.e. the informational ambience), Ausubel's 
interactional product, consequently, takes the form of a bilinear 
isomorphism  that combines elements of these two spaces, s and 
I  (Konrad, 2007). 
subsumer can always recognize an external 
stimulus when there is complementarity between 
its strings. The matching (association) of 
information and subsumers is determined by 
considering the number of complementary shapes. 
For instance, if a subsumer in a 2-D space (ℓ = 2) 
is represented by the string (0 1), and an input is 
represented by the string (1 0), a cognitive change 
takes place; however, the matching between 
strings does not need to be perfect (some 
mismatches are allowed). These differences 
between strings reflect the degree of affinity 
between them and determine the quality of the 
cognitive change4, . 
 
Basal subsumption process 
 
Equation (1) is a differential model of several 
variables, representing a complex network of 
manifold connections between units of 
information and subsumers, and between 
subsumers and other subsumers; considering 
                                                          
4
 It is worth remembering that Ausubel's theory holds that new 
information is linked to relevant pre-existing aspects of cognitive 
structure with both the newly acquired information and the pre-
existing structure being modified in the process — based on this 
conceptual model, Ausubelian theory describes the cognitive 
process of subsumption with its underlying principles of 
progressive differentiation and integrative reconciliation (Nielson, 
1980). But, for this cognitive process occurs, the linkage between 
new information and pre-existing structure must be made by means 
of an Ausubelian interactional product, an Ausubelian matching.  
Ausubel’s premises, this differential equation can 
be seen as a first-approximation hypothesis, an 
occam’s razor-like model for human meaningful 
learning.   
 
In this paper, equation (1) is studied in the context 
of a thought experiment for the simplest 
manifestation of intelligence, i.e., a clever being 
with only one subsumer that is able to process 
only a single unit of information per unit time. A 
mind with such characteristics is similar to the 
memory of the well-known Maxwell's demon5 
within the one-molecule engine described by 
Szilárd. This imaginary creature can extract 
information concerning the position of a single 
gas particle in an adiabatic box, and this position 
is the sole information that it can (learn) process. 
From a thermodynamic perspective, the mind of 
Maxwell's demon has been thoroughly 
investigated. Thermodynamically, Maxwell’s 
creature is only a heat machine; it is a computing 
apparatus that can process information into its 
phase space, which constitutes its inanimate 
memory. However, from a constructivist 
                                                          
5
 Maxwell's demon is a "clever" creature designed by James C. 
Maxwell with the extra-natural power to reduce the entropy of an 
isolated physical system, so violating the Second Law of 
thermodynamics. Maxwell's demon was "exorcised" by Szilárd in 
1929 (Szilárd, 1925; Zurek, 1990). 
perspective, Maxwell’s demon in our thought 
experiment can also simulate a tiny intelligent 
being that is able to acquire knowledge. 
 
According to the constructivist Ausubelian, a 
being that is able to learn must have a pre-existing 
mental structure that contains pre-designed 
concepts. Thus, using a one-subsumer approach 
for equation (1), Maxwell's demon mind should 
accomplish a basal subsumption of information, as 
follows:                                                                
,s I
dS D sI
dt
= ,                                                    (2) 
where the pre-existing structure of this creature is, 
per se, constituted by its single subsumer 
, and  is the unit of 
information matched by the demon’s mind that is 
available in Szilárd’s one-molecule engine. This 
unit of information, conditionally required by the 
law of mass action (Jones et al. 2010), is an input 
per unit of time. The condition  is also 
required because Maxwell’s demon is assumed to 
be based on only one subsumer. Inasmuch as its 
framework is unable to relate multiple (or at least 
two) subsumers among themselves, this creature is 
non-reasoning. This demon can be thought of 
equivalently as a non-deductive being, which is 
governed only by cognitive system 1. 
 
This way, one-subsumer equation (2) captures the 
essence of the Ausubelian principle of learning by 
progressive differentiation when a new unit of 
information, , is linked to relevant pre-existing 
aspects of an individual’s mental structure, , and 
the pre-existing structure is modified in the 
process. In a Szilárd scenario (Maroney, 2009), 
the values of the variables that describe this 
subsumptive (perceptual) learning in terms of 
changes in the mental state of Maxwell's demon 
can be given by Brookes' procedural 
representation (Todd, 1999; Burgin, 2010). In his 
seminal “Fundamental Equation of Information 
Science,” Brookes (1980) used a concept 
pointedly based on process of Ausubelian 
progressive differentiation. This representation, 
which can also be thought how a state transition, 
is defined by , wherein the 
state of mind  changes to another state 
, due to the input of one unit of 
information, , and is an indicator of the effect 
this modification on the cognitive framework.  
 
Given these formulations for a time-independent 
input, and accounting the limits of the integration 
provided by Brookes' representation, equation (2) 
is solved as follows6: 
                                                         
( )
( )
,
1 K S S
t K S
s I
dsIdt
D s
+∆
∆
=∫ ∫ ,                                     (3) 
where  and  are the a priori and a 
posteriori states7 of Maxwell's creature, 
respectively8 (Cole, 1997). 
 
Perceptual system as a purely physical 
communication channel 
 
Considering the entire subsumption process of 
                                                          
6
 Here, 
,s ID  appears outside the integral, because it is not a direct 
function of s  and I , but depends only on measure of the distance 
between a given information, I , and a reference subsume, s . 
This metric space is a number, a normalized length equal to 0 when 
s  and I  are maximally similar, and equal to 1 when s  and I  
are maximally dissimilar (Li et al., 2004). 
 
7
 Brookes' equation represents the procedure for the retention of 
information described by Ausubel's theory of meaningful learning, 
when information and the subsumer can still be dissociated. This 
notation, considering the plus sign (+) in Brookes' equation, 
assumes the form of a superposition that indicates a cognitive 
change provoked by an external stimulus, leading the one-
subsumer cognitive structure from state S  to state S S+ ∆ . The 
consequence of this superposition concept is the immediate 
characterization of ( )K S  as an eigenvalue associated with 
eigenstate S , and ( )K S S+ ∆  as an eigenvalue associated with 
eigenstate S S+ ∆ , which gives us the integration limits used in 
equation(3). In this context, it would be preferable to define the 
process of cognitive change as Brookes' superposition (or Brookes’ 
state transition), rather than Brookes' equation. 
 
8
 Cole (2011) claims that the use of information in information 
science is firmly linked to the information itself, which Brookes 
(1980) defined in his fundamental equation of information science 
as that which modifies a user’s knowledge structure. In an earlier 
paper, Cole (1997) advocated a quantitative treatment for 
information based on Brookes' viewpoint. Bawden (2011) also 
suggests a possible quantitative treatment of Brookes' equation. 
information as contained within the perceptual 
system, the working memory capacity of this 
creature can be determined by 
; consequently, equation 
(3) can be rewritten as follows9:               
,
1 1 ln 1 ( )s I
KI
D t K S
 ∆
= + ∆  
                                   (4)                                                                                                                             
For the matching range (
,
0 1s ID≤ ≤ ), equation (4) 
can be recasted as the following inequality:                                                       
1 ln 1 ( )
KI
t K S
 ∆≥ + ∆  
                                          (5) 
This logarithmic expression (5) is a Shannon-
Hartley-like quantity (Burgin, 2010; Seising, 
2010) with cognitive characteristics representing 
the processing capacity given in units of 
information per unit time, where a bandwidth in 
equation (4) can be identified as a function of both 
the subsumption time ( ) and the noise/noiseless 
matching (
,
0 1s ID≤ ≤ ) between the external input 
and the mental structure of Maxwell’s demon. In 
equation (5),  represents the information 
storage, which has at least two distinguishable 
states of knowledge after the effect of an input 
                                                          
9
 For convenience, 
( )ln ( )
K S S
K S
 + ∆
 
 
 was rewritten 
as ln 1 ( )
K
K S
 ∆
+ 
 
, because we not know the 
( )
( )
K S S
K S
+ ∆
  
ratio, but the ( )
K
K S
∆
 term can be determined, as will be shown 
below. 
(the left- or right-side position of the particle 
inside the bi-partitioned Szilárd's box), and  
is a channel characteristic that represents a pre-
existing memory state. This calculation, which is 
based on a constructivist treatment of Szilárd’s 
one-molecule engine, supports the recent 
computationalist argument reviewed by Laming 
(2010), in which the main premise is to consider 
the human mind as a purely physical 
communication system whose performance 
depends on the match between external stimulus 
and channel characteristics10.  
Information-to-energy conversion 
Taking into account recent works on information-
to-energy conversion, in an isothermal heat bath 
as such Szilárd’s one-molecule engine, 
information can be converted to energy up to 
Bk TI ( Sagawa&Ueda, 2010; Toyabe, et al., 
2010). Thus, equation (5) can be subjected to a 
thermal treatment by scaling factor of Bk T , so that 
Maxwell's demon reaches the maximum 
efficiency11: 
                                                          
10
 Brookes (1981) also suggested a logarithmic expression to solve 
his equation. From a perspectivist approach, he outlined a skeleton 
of an equation to represent the carrying of information into the 
human mind on the same basis as Hartley's law (Castro,2013). 
11
 Toyabe, et al.(2010) have  achieved the 
ln( )B Bk TI k T≥  relationship for a quasistatic information heat 
engine such as the Szilárd engine – in their notation, I is 
equivalent to I t∆ , in our calculation.  
                                                     
( )ln 1
B
B
k T Kk TI
t K S
 ∆≥ +  ∆  
,                                 (6) 
                                                                                         
where  is the Boltzmann constant and  is the 
absolute temperature of the microcanonical 
ensemble.  
 
Denoting the amount of information per unit time, 
I , by info,  equation (6) becomes           
                                                   
ln 1 ( )
B
B
k Tinfo Kk T
t t K S
 ∆  ≥ +  ∆ ∆   
  .                      (7) 
 
It is known that in a thermally isolated one-
molecule system, such as Szilárd’s apparatus, 
Bk T is the thermodynamic work to be 
accomplished for each step performed.  More 
fundamentally, Bk T is the Helmholtz free energy, 
a minimum amount of heat required per unit of 
information to increase the entropy of  Szilárd’s 
apparatus by one unit of information (Levitin, 
1998; Plenio&Vitelli, 2001; Toyabe, et al., 2010; 
Sagawa&Ueda, 2008). 
 
So, equation (7) can be rewritten as follows:                        
                                                     
info ln 1 ( )
Bk T KE
t t K S
 ∆ ∆ ≥ +  ∆ ∆   
,                         (8) 
Rearranging the terms12,                                                                      
                                                       
ln 1 ( )B
KE k T per info
K S
 ∆∆ ≥ + 
 
.                       (9) 
Still, considering the working memory capacity, 
, and that in Brookes’ 
schema the state of mind  changes to another 
state  due to the input of one unit of 
information, the ratio between demon's mental 
states can be given by ( )( )
B
E
k TK S e
K S S
∆
−
≥
+ ∆
, where
 
B
E
k T
e
∆
−
is the Boltzmann weighting factor (Kittel, 
1980). From the Boltzmann factor it is possible to 
infer a quantum behavior of intuition-system, as 
will be emphasized in footnote (16). 
 
Forgetting of information 
  
In Szilárd's hypothetical world, the position of the 
particle inside the bi-partitioned box is all that 
Maxwell's demon can learn. This limitation 
restricts the working memory capacity of the 
creature such that it can only acquire a single unit 
of information at a time. However, considering 
                                                          
12
 Whereas 
heatE
info∆ = , such as shown by Levitin (1998), for 
that Bk T is  a minimum amount of heat per unit of information, 
the 
ln( ) 1
info
⋅
= condition must then be satisfied.  
Maxwell’s demon as a clever being, the 
Ausubelian subsumption process of information 
can be employed to restore its mind, but two 
essential stages referred to as “retention” and 
“obliterative” must be taken into account13.  
 
These two cognitive stages are drawn by 
Brookes’equation of Ausubelian subsumption 
process of  
information14, ( ) ( ) ( )K S I K S I K S S+ → + ∆ , 
where I  is retained (anchored) in ( )K S by means 
of an interactional product that yields an unstable 
quantity, ( )K S I . Over time, the ( )K S I  quantity is 
no longer dissociable, and the subsumer is 
modified to acquire additional subsumed 
meanings. As a result, the obliterative phase arises 
and a “forgetting” occurs, in which the 
information is internalized into the new stable 
structure, ( ) ( )K S I K S S→ + ∆ 15. At the end of 
                                                          
13
 In Ausubel’s theory, meaningfull learning occurs when the 
individual creates a connection between information, I , and 
subsumer, s , resulting in an “interactional product” sI  (Moreira, 
2011). The notion of subsumption of information in the Ausubelian 
meaningfull learning  is that s and I remain dissociated from the 
product sI  during the first stage of assimilation process of 
information and, over time, I  becomes closely linked with s , 
being anchored in the ideational complex sI .  
14
 According to Todd(1999), Brookes also assumed that the unit of 
knowledge is concept based, a notion derived from Ausubel's 
assimilation theory of cognitive learning. 
15
 During the process of assimilation, the new meaningful 
gradually loses its identity as it becomes part of the modified 
anchoring structure. This process is termed obliterative 
the obliteration process, I  is absorbed into the 
mental space, emptying the working memory 
again in order to allow the assimilation of new 
information by Maxwell’s demon – in Ausubel's 
words himself, ( )K S  and I are “reduced to the 
least common denominator” (Ausubel,1963; 
Ausubel, 2010; Brown, 2007). 
 
Landauer limit from a cognitive squeeze 
The obliterative phase of subsumption is nothing 
more than the mapping of two mental states, 
( )K S  and I , into one, . Consequently, 
Ausubelian forgetting yields a cognitive 
squeeze16, applying a relative change to demon's 
                                                                                                  
subsumption and is dependent on dissociability strength between 
s and I . This gradual loss of separable identity ends with the 
meaning being forgoteen when the idea falls below the “threshold 
of availability” proposed by Ausubel. (Seel,2012). 
 
16
 Brookes' equation shows that the two cognitive states, ( )K S  
and I , are compressed into one state, ( )K S S+ ∆ . Thus, the 
( )
K
K S
∆
 term represents a relative cognitive change, a squeeze 
cognitive (a reduction) equal to - 50%. Consequently, the 
Boltzmann factor obtained from equation (9) is 2B
E
k T
e
∆
−
≤ , since 
( )
( )
K S S
K S
+ ∆
 is equal to1 ( )
K
K S
∆
+ .  This weighting factor 
evaluates the relative probability of a determined state occurring in 
a multi-state system, i.e., it is a “non-normalized probability” that 
needs be  for the system to be described for a non-quantum 
statistics; otherwise, the system exhibits quantum behavior (Carter, 
2001). So, the Boltzmann factor ≤ 2 calculated here indicates that 
the subsumption process requires a quantum statistics to describe 
the cognitive learning. In other words, our calculation suggests that 
the final stage of the subsumption process of information – within 
the Kahneman’s intuition-system –  produces a quantum quantity, 
as Aerts(2011) has advocated. Toyabe, et al.(2010) and 
Sagawa&Ueda (2008) also have achieved  this same value for the 
mind that is equal to . Inserting this 
cognitive squeeze17 into equation (9) and 
considering Shannon’s binary digit as basic unit of 
information in computing, we obtain from the 
cognizer’s mind the quantity known as the 
Landauer limit (Plenio&Vitelli, 2001):                                               
                                                       
ln(2)BE k T per bit∆ ≥ − ,                                   (10) 
or ultimately, BE k T per nat∆ ≥ − , where, 
1 ln(2)bit nat=  (Levitin, 1998; Sagawa&Ueda, 
2010). 
 
In “Waiting for Landauer,” Norton (2011) claimed 
“Landauer's principle asserts that there is an 
unavoidable cost in thermodynamic entropy 
creation when data is erased. It is usually derived 
from incorrect assumptions, most notably, that 
erasure must compress the phase space of a 
memory device ...”. However, in this paper, we 
show that the Landauer limit given by equation 
                                                                                                  
Boltzmann factor in an feedback control system, however, they 
raised this outcome by means of physics; here, we were able to 
achieve this outcome by means of psychology. 
 
17
 As an external stimulus is subsumed into an individual's 
knowledge structure – which, from Bennett's thermodynamics 
viewpoint, corresponds to the deletion of information from 
memory devices – the relative cognitive change ( )
K
K S
 ∆
 
 
 
assumes negative values, indicating a cognitive squeeze.  
 
(10) appears in a cognoscitive world after a 
“cognitive squeeze” that is required to complete 
the subsumption process. This outcome is similar 
to that found from a thermodynamic perspective 
when Bennett's (compression) erasing is processed 
into the mind (computer memory) of Maxwell's 
demon (Bennett, 1982; Bennett, 1987; Bennett, 
2003).  
 
In Bennett's words, “...from its beginning, the 
history of the Maxwell’s demon problem has 
involved discussions of the role of the demon’s 
intelligence, and indeed, of how and whether one 
ought to characterize an intelligent being ...” 
(Bennett, 2003). In this study, our calculation 
instigates two interpretations: (a) when Maxwell's 
demon is interpreted as a classical machine, the 
demon is able to process information in agreement 
with  Ausubel's meaningful learning theory, 
indicating the possibility that a machine can learn 
how a human learns; (b) when Maxwell's demon 
is interpreted as an intelligent being equipped 
solely as a fast system of type 1, it encounters the 
fundamental thermodynamic principle of 
computation (the Landauer limit), as an immediate 
consequence of the Ausubelian obliterative 
process; which shows the computational feature of 
a thinking system of type 1.  
 
As soon, if computational presuppositions are 
essential conditions for the plausibility of the 
computational theory of mind, this dualist 
viewpoint now provides at least one reason for the 
plausibility: Landauer's thermodynamic limit is 
shared between cognizers and machines.  
 
Landauer efficiency 
 
In a recent work, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird 
(2012), citing Kahneman’s last work (2011), wrote 
that “Cognitive psychologists similarly distinguish 
between system 1, which makes rapid automatic 
inferences based on heuristics, and system 2, 
which makes slower conscious deliberations based 
on systematic and perhaps normative principles. 
What is missing from these theories is an 
algorithmic account of the processes on which 
system 1 relies”. In the present work, we have 
mathematically shown that system 1 relies on 
Landauer’s thermodynamic principle, which 
indicates that it works exactly as a programmable 
machine designed to carry out perceptual 
operations sequentially and automatically. This 
result, which is based on cognitive premises, 
strongly suggests that the system 1 addressed in 
Kahman's theory is actually similar to an 
associative machine, quantitatively evidencing the 
computational theory of mind in terms of the 
thinking system 1. In addition, if system 1 is 
considered to be a powerful computer operating at 
maximum Landauer efficiency – i.e., at a 
minimum energy cost equal to ( )ln 2Bk T  – that 
works at an average brain temperature, the number 
of perceptual operations per second that it could 
perform is on the order of 1023 (1/kB ) , depending 
on the idiosyncratic power of the brain. This rate 
of operation is quite fast, as Kahneman has 
theorized, and it is also inexpensive! 
 
 
Computational theory of mind: an 
experimental outlook 
The psycho-philosophical hypothesis that thought 
is a kind of computation, if supported by 
experimental evidence, would imply that a 
substantial amount of disparate research fields, 
from cognitive psychology to information theory, 
could be unified, and that a new formalism could 
be introduced for broader consideration. Taking 
into account this scenario, the calculation 
presented here offers an innovative standpoint — 
an energy perspective — regarding the 
foundations of human thought, and it can 
circumstantially provide an observable mode to 
experimentally ascertain the controversial 
computational theory of mind that has so far been 
lacking in quantitative arguments, in particular 
regarding whether or not a Turing-like algorithm 
is the operational substratum underlying the 
perceptual system (Davenport, 2012; Swiatczak, 
2011; Pinker, 2005; Fodor, 2000). It is worth 
remembering that, although the Turing machine 
constitutes the basis of the debate on 
computationalism (Fresco, 2012), such a stored-
program device is considered only an abstraction 
of a computing apparatus, a nonphysical framing, 
i.e. Turing's machine cannot be subject to 
experimental verification.  
 
However, quite recently, Frasca (2012), in a 
preprint entitled, "Probabilistic Turing Machine 
and Landauer Limit", argues that Landauer's 
energy boundary can be obtained from a Turing 
machine18. This Frasca’s inference is in 
consonance with our conception of the vinculum 
between the Landauer limit and the computational 
theory of the mind19 and, as a result of that 
                                                          
18
 This singular consequence reinforces the idea that Landauer 
limit is an intrinsic feature of algorithmic rules, rather than a 
quantity associated to physical part of computer. 
19
 For certain, we are not asserting that the human mind, as a 
whole, operates like an algorithmic machine, but, when system 2 
was left out of our calculation for the reason explained above, the 
outcome pointed precisely to Landauer's principle of 
thermodynamics, which – considering Frasca's work – 
mathematically indicates that the adaptive (associative) learning 
process (notably Ausubel's progressive differentiation) works in the 
same way as a step-by-step computational procedure. 
 
relationship, the theoretical essay presented in this 
paper becomes a possible (and challenging) 
alternative to experimentally test the 
computationalist hypothesis of the associative 
cognitive process, since the Landauer limit can be 
empirically checked20. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, the meaningful learning process (i.e., 
without considering Ausubel’s rote learning) was 
divided into two parts in equation (1). The first 
part refers to an association of external 
information with binding sites (subsumers) of an 
individual's cognitive structure, which is an 
involuntary process governed by system 1. The 
second refers to interaction between subsumers, 
representing a self-interaction, the capacity to 
deduce, and to voluntarily use the logical process; 
such a capacity is governed by system 2. An 
example of a system 1 event in the context of 
human learning is the presentation of a word that 
"automatically" elicits other concepts (subsumers) 
                                                          
20
 Recently, a group of researchers was able to experimentally 
show Landauer's principle in a two-state bit memory (Bérut et al., 
2012). It is therefore plausible to presume that Landauer's principle 
in human mind can also be subjected to experimentation. 
Landauer's limit is an energy boundary, in the form of heat 
dissipation – a physical quantity, which can provide a robust 
evidence of an algorithmic-like activity within the "gears" of a type 
1 cognitive system. In addition, Landauer's boundary can also 
quantitatively underpin latest Kahneman’s qualitative 
presuppositions for a intuition-system (Morewedge&Kahneman, 
2010). 
 
that are associated with it in cognitive structure. In 
a perceptual process, the operating characteristics 
of system 1 involve the use of previous 
knowledge to gather and interpret the external 
stimuli registered by the senses. Within system 1, 
stimuli are matched (associated) to a set of 
templates (patterns) stored in memory, and when a 
match is located, the new knowledge is learned.  
 
From this conceptualization, we proposed the 
equation (2), solving it from the scenario of 
Szilárd’s one-molecule engine (a variant of 
Maxwell’s demon thought experiment) to support 
a single-subsumer-like approach, thereby causing 
the second part of equation (1) to vanish – namely, 
disregarding the part denotes which Fodor (2000) 
calls non-modular system. This approach supports 
the notion of a thinking creature, although non-
reasoning, that is able to use only the perceptual 
system – or modular system in Fodor (2000)’s 
view – to process a unit of information at time
. 
The calculation presented in this report shows that 
the obliterative phase of human meaningful 
learning proposed by Ausubel works in the same 
way as the process of thermodynamic 
compression proposed by Landauer (1961) and 
Bennett (1982; 1987; 2003), subject to the same 
energetic cost as a machine to restore its binary 
memory. In other words, from the Maxwell-
Szilárd apparatus, we have shown that each bit 
processed by a cognizer needs one Ausubelian 
obliteration, and a minimum amount of energy per 
bit is required in this process. This minimum 
energy cost (the Landauer limit) returned to the 
environment of Maxwell-Szilárd's demon after a 
thermodynamic compression is a thermodynamic 
principle associated with the erasure (discarding) 
of information by binary machines, specifically, a 
one-bit logical operation that restores 0 and 1 to 0, 
which corresponds to the obliterative process in 
cognizers. This compression process is necessary 
for a binary device to reset its memory (Landauer, 
1961; Lambson et al. 2011; Bérut et al. 2012), and 
Bennett (1982; 1987; 2003) has explained this 
process entirely for computers from the 
thermodynamic viewpoint. The novel finding 
presented in this report is that we have explained 
the same process from the cognitive viewpoint, 
which gives rise to a new perspective in terms of 
artificial intelligence. Ahead of this finding, the 
great challenge seems to be solving equation (1) 
when it also includes the second term that 
represents the system 2, what is the human being 
itself. Thereby, we strongly believe that the study 
of a full solution for this equation can open a new 
protocol, which will allow the transfer of the 
principles of human reasoning to computers. 
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